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The purpose of this paper is to estimate a model that incorporates theeffects of financial
decisions on production, profitability, and productivity growth. Asymmetricinformation
generates agency costs of debt and signalingbenefits of dividends which then influence
production decisions. The model is applied to the U.S. manufacturingsector.
Agency costs and signaling benefits are measured bytheir effects on profitability. A one
percent increase in debt reduces variable profit by0.04 percent, while a one percent increase in
dividends raises variable profit by 0.12 percent. Agency costs also limitthe adjustment of U.S.
manufacturing to long-run equilibrium. On average, for $1.00of funds raised through bond
issues, debt adjustment cost is about $0.05. The dynamic efficiencyof the manufacturing sector
is affected by financial considerations. Signaling benefits contribute4.2 percent to total factor
productivity growth, while agency costs reduce efficiency by3.3 percent. Thus the financial
effects on dynamic efficiency approximately offset each other.
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The major purpose of this paper is to investigate how financial decisions affect production,
profitability, and productivity growth. In particular, the focus is on the impact arisingfrom the
agency costs associated with debt and the signalingbenefits of dividends. Output supply and input
demand are influenced by financial structure due to the existence of asymmetric information among
equity and debt holders. Asymmetric information generates incentiveconflicts among the various
claimants to the flow of funds. These incentive conflicts give rise to the agency costs of bond
financing and to the signaling benefits of dividend payments, which in turn affect production
decisions.
In the theoretical literature the existence of informational imperfections has provided the
means to generate interdependencies between production and financial structure (seethe survey by
Fazzari, Hubbard in Petersen (1988) and references therein).' More recently Kim andMaksimovic
(1990) examine the effect of agency costs on productivity growth for the U.S.airline industry, and
Greenwald, Kohn and Stiglitz (1990) look at the influence of agency costs on productivity growth
for the U.S. private sector. Generally, in this literature, debt levels are determined through a trade-
off between agency costs and tax shields, while dividends are set by a trade-off between tax
disadvantages and signaling benefits. There is little empirical evidence regarding the magnitudesof
agency costs and signaling benefits and their effects on production, profitabilityand productivity
growth. The focus of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on these issues, as theyrelate to the
U.S. manufacturing sector.
The framework that we adopt integrates production technology with debt agency costs and
dividend signaling benefits. In developing the model we show how duality theory can beextended
to allow for the interdependencies between production and financialdecisions.2 The significance of
the dual approach is that production and financial decisions are simultaneously modelled. Thus,for
example, the tax cost of dividends affects output supply and input demand,while conversely, output
and input prices (or in other words, revenue and production cost) affect dividend payments.The
model is a set of simultaneous equations consisting of the equilibrium conditions of output,variable
inputs, capital, debt and dividends. These conditions define a temporary equilibrium, asthere are2
costs of adjustment to long-run equilibrium.3 In this paper there are two coststhat limit adjustment
to long-run equilibrium. The first type of cost is associated withthe installation of capital. Capital
installation cost is the traditional source of a dynamic adjustment process. The second sourcearises
from capital financing and is defined by the agency costs from debt issues. In this paper weestimate
adjustment costs from both capital installation and debt issues for U.S. manufacturing.
Financial structure affects output supply, input demand, and therefore allocative and
dynamic efficiency. We measure the effects of fmancing decisions on profitand productivity growth
for the U.S. manufacturing sector. TFP growth is the difference between output and input growth
rates and traditional measures of TFP growth can be decomposed into technological changeand
returns to scale components. In this paper, the decomposition of TFP growth is extended toshow
how both debt financing and dividend payments influence dynamic efficiency for the U.S.
manufacturing sector.
This paper is organized in the following manner: In section 2 the model is developed.
Section 3 contains a discussion of the data and the estimation results. In section 4, results are
presented on the interrelationship between production, profitability, and financing. In section 5are
estimates of the adjustment costs associated with capital installation and debt financing. Section 6
pertains to the effects of signaling benefits and agency costs on the decomposition of TFP growth.
The last section of the paper is the conclusion.3
I. THE MODEL
A production process can be represented by the function
(I)y(t) F(v(t), vm(t), K(t -1),AK(t),t)
where y is output, F is the production function, v is an n-dimensional vector of variable inputs, mis
the managerial input, K is the capital input, AK is the change in the capital input, and t is the
indicator of technology that also represents the time period.4 The managerial input relates to the
services of planning, organizing, and monitoring inputs in order to facilitate technologically efficient
production (See Maksimovic (1986) and Brander and Spencer (1989) for a discussion of managerial
inputs and financial structure.). Capital adjustment costs are represented by the changes in the
capital input. In order to install the capital input into the production process, adjustment costs are
incurred and these costs are manifested by the foregone output from the diversion of resources to
capital installation.5
Managerial decisions cannot be costlessly monitored by shareholders and bondholders. The
asymmetric information between managers and financiers cause incentives to diverge between the
agents. Leland and Pyle (1977), Ross (1977), Bhattacharyya (1979), Myers and Majluf (1984), and
Bemheim (1991) treat share issues and dividend payments as signaling devices. Firms pay dividends
to signal that there is an adequate net flow of funds. Indeed, firms pay dividends and make up any
shortfall in funds with share issues. The signaling benefits of dividends are traded-off against the
higher taxes associated with dividend payments (see King (1977), Auerbach (1979), and Poterba and
Summers (1985)).
Asymmetric information causes bond issues to be a source of agency costs. Jensen and
Meckling (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and Greenwald, Kohn and Stiglitz (1990) have shown
that, in the context of asymmetric information, firms can undertake comparatively risky investment
projects that increase the exposure of creditors. Myers (1977) also suggests that debt is costly
because it causes firms to pass up profitable investment projects. The reason is that part of the
benefits of a project accrue to creditors while shareholders bear the costs. Debt issues result in
agency costs traded off against the tax reduction associated with interest payments on debt.4
In order to capture the signaling benefits of dividends and agency costsassociated with debt,
we define a managerial cost function,
(2) cm(t) =pH(D(t),B(t -1),AB(t))
where ctm is managerial cost, .iisthe managerial input price, D is dividends, B is the value of
outstanding bonds, and B is the value of newbonds.6 The costs of debt and the benefits from
dividends are manifested by the function, H, which is decreasing in debt and increasingin
dividends.7 One aspect of a manager's organizing function is to obtain financing for the firm. The
ability to raise funds will be enhanced if a fmn pays higher and sustained dividends,while its ability
to raise funds is reduced if its existing debt is high or if it goes to the bondmarket for new debt. In
this model there are agency costs associated with both outstanding debt and new bond issues.The
latter are referred to as debt adjustment costs.
The H function can be considered to be a financing ability function. As financing ability
increases, the demand for managerial services increases and so managerial input cost rises.
Conversely, as financing ability decreases, managerial input demand decreases. Formallythe link
between managerial input demand and the H function can be derived from an application of
Shephard's Lemma (see Diewert (1982)). Indeed, vm(t) =&m(t)/ä1.i=H(D(t),B(t -1),B(t)). Thus
the function H is the managerial input demand function. Substituting the managerial input demand
function for vm(t) in the production function yields
(3)y(t) =.(v(t),D(t), B(t -1),K(t -1),K(t), AB(t), t).
Equation (3) depicts an augmented production function that includes financial variables, 9is a
production cum managerial function, since it represents both the production process and
managerial cost. From (3), we see that debt and dividends affect output and input quantities. An
increase in outstanding debt lowers managerial demand, which in turn decreases output (given
nonmanagerial inputs). In addition, given output, changes in the level of outstanding debt affect
both capital and noncapital inputs. Changes in new debt issues and dividends also generate output5
andinput effects through the same mechanism.'
Capital stock accumulates by
(4)K(t) =1(t)+ (1 -6)K(t-1)
where 0 < 6 < 1 is the fixed depreciation rate and I is investment.
The flow of funds relating production and financing decisions is
(5) P1(t)y(t)-PT(t)v(t)-Q(t)I(t)-R(t)B(t.1) + A B(t) + A S(t) -D(t)=0
where P1 is the post-tax price of output, pT is the vector of post-tax variable factor prices, Qisthe
post-tax purchase price of capital, R is the post-tax interest rate on debt, and AS is the value of
share issues.9
Production and financing decisions are determined by the maximization of the expected
discounted value of equity. Thus, the problem is to
(6) maxE(t)E u(t,t) (D(r) (1 -u(t))/(1-u(r))
-AS(x))
(y,v,l,D.AS.AB)
subject to equations (3) -(5), withgiven initial capital and debt levels. The discount factor is a(t,t) =
1,(t,t + 1) =[(1+ (p(t + 1) (1 -u(t+ 1))I(1- u,(t+ 1)))]1,wherep is the discount rate, u1, is the
personal income tax rate, and u, is the capital gains tax with 0 < u, < u < 1. Shareholders are
subject to dividend taxation at the personal income tax rate (see Poterba and Summers (1985)).
The intertemporal production and fmancing problem can be solved in two stages. The first
stage relates to the determination of the short-run equilibrium. The short-run equilibrium is
obtained from6
(7) maxP1(t) y(t)- P2(t)D(t)-PT(t)v(t)
(y,v,D)
subjectto equations (3) and (5)conditionalon capital stock and debt levels; where P2 =(u
-
u,)/(1-
0can be considered the price of dividends, which is the additional tax shareholders incur per
dollar of dividends relative to receiving a dollar of capital gains. In the short run post-tax variable
profit net of dividends is maximized by selecting output, variable factors and dividends. In
particular, the tax cost associated with dividends is offset at the margin by the signaling benefits
through greater managerial ability to finance production. Conditional on capital stock and debt
levels, dividend payments are determined simultaneously with output supply and variable factor
demand. Thus, post-tax output and variable factor prices influence dividend payments, and
conversely the price of dividends affects output supply and variable factor demand.
Another way that financial variables affect production in the short run is through debt
levels. Changes in debt alter the supply of output through the marginal product of managerial
input, and also debt affects the demand for the variable factors through the rate of substitution
between these inputs and managerial input. In addition, changes in debt influence dividend
payments, as agency costs affect signaling ability. Lastly, in the short run, capital accumulation and
technological change affect the relative marginal product of the managerial input, and hence
dividend payments change as a consequence.
The solution to the problem defined by (6) yields a post-tax net (of dividends) variable profit
function,
(8)4(t) =•(P1(t),P2(t) ,PT(t), K(t -1),B(t -1),K(t), 8(t), t)
In order to empirically implement the model a functional form must be assumed for the post-tax net
variable profit function!° We assume that the functional form is translog (see Jorgenson (1986))7





where P, is the post-tax output price, P2 is the dividend price, P3,.., P2 are the post-tax variable
factor prices, KK is capital, K8 is debt and = , P. The net (of dividends) variable profit
function is homogeneous of degree one in prices. In order to impose this condition, net variable
profit and prices are normalized by a variable factor price." It is assumed that when net
investment and new bond issues are zero then marginal capital and debt adjustment costs are
zero.'2 This assumption has the effect of making adjustment costs separable from the other
components of net variable profit. Thus adjustment costs are defined as
(10)c'=.5Ea,,AKkAKI
k-K I-K
where zkI = ak, KK is the change in capital and K8 is the change in debt. In this specification new
debt issues affect the marginal adjustment cost of capital and capital expansion affects the marginal
adjustment cost of debt. This interaction reflects that new debt is issued in part because of capital
stock expansion.'3
Using the specification of the net variable profit function, the short-run equilibrium
conditions can be obtained by an extension of Hotelling's Lemma (see Diewert (1982)) to include
dividends
(11)s = + Eln(P/P+2)+ EIklnKk+PlIt8
where s1 =P1y/4,i =1is output, i2 is dividends for which y1 -D and for i =3,... , n+ 1,
y, =-V1.Equation set (11) shows that in short-run equilibrium the output, dividends and variable
factor components of post-tax net variable profit depend on relative prices, capital stock,
outstanding debt, and the technology indicator.'4
The second stage of the production and financing problem relates to the intertemporal
aspects. In this stage investment, debt issues and share issues are determined. Using equations (4)
and (8), and substituting into (6), the problem is to
(12)max E(t)E a(t,t)[(.) -R(r)B(t-1)+ B(v) -B(r-1)-Q(r)(K(t)-(1- - 1)].
In (12) the intertemporal production and financing decisions relate to the determination of the levels
of capital and debt. Share issues are determined as a residual in this model. Once the new levels of
capital and debt have been determined, then the implied investment and new debt issues can be
obtained. Next, substituting the solutions for capital and debt into equation set (11) permits the
determination of output supply, dividend payments and variable factor demands. Lastly, using the
flow of funds, equation (5),allowsus to solve for new share issues.'
Substituting the specific form of the post-tax net variable profit and adjustment cost
functions into (12) and carrying out the maximization leads to the following Euler equation
(13.1) -c.,AKK(t) -AK(t)-Q(t)+ E(t)a(t, t + 1) ([+lnKK(t)
a,I
+P,lnKB(t) + ln(P1(t + 1)/P2(t + 1) + Kt(t+1)] 4'(t + 1)P2(t + l)/KK(t)
+ aKKsKK(t + 1) + aKBAKB(t + I)- Q(t + 1)(l -)) = 09
(13.2) BBAKB(t) -aAKK(t)+ I + E(t)(t, t + 1) ([3 + 581nK8(t)+ lflK(t)
n,1
+ 1ln(P1(t + 1)/P+2(t + 1)) + p(t + 1)]4(t + 1)P2(t + l)fK(t)
+ UBBAKB(t + 1) + uKAKK(t + 1) -R(t+ 1) -1)=0
Equation (13.1) relates to capital. It shows that the expected marginal post-tax profit of
capital in period t+ 1 inclusive of expected adjustment cost and post-tax purchase price savings from
the previous peridd undepreciated capital stock is offset against the post-tax contemporary purchase
of capital inclusive of marginal adjustment cost. Equation (13.2) relates to debt. It shows that the
expected marginal reduction in post-tax profit in period t+ 1 due to the agency costs of debt inclusive
of interest payments but net of expected debt adjustment cost savings from issuing debt in the
previous period is offset against the current additional funds from a dollar of debt net of marginal
debt adjustment costs from issuing the debt. The Euler equations show that capital and debt have
opposite effects on variable profit. The benefit of capital is the profit it generates. The benefit of
debt is the additional funds flowing to the firm, while profit is reduced due to the agency costs
associated with debt. The complete model that is to be estimated consists of equations (9), (10),
(11), and (13).
II. DATA AND ESTIMATION
The data relate to the U.S. manufacturing sector for the period 1953 to 1986. The data on
quantities and prices of output, labor and intermediate inputs were obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (see Gullickson and Harper [1986] for a detailed description of the data). These
data are based on the Census and Annual Surveys of Manufactures, the BLS Current Establishment
Survey and the Census of Service industries.
Data on the quantity of output are obtained as a Tornqvist index of gross outputs at the
four-digit level from the Census of Manufactures. The output price index is derived implicitly as a
ratio of the current value to the quantity of output.
There are two variable factors, labor and intermediate inputs. Labor input is measured in10
terms of payroll hours, estimated, for production workers, on the basis of the BLSCurrent
Establishment Survey. Hours of non-production workers are estimated on the basis of the data
underlying the BLS quarterly labor measures for durable and non-durable manufacturing. Hours of
proprietors are taken from the BLS Current Population Survey. The labor input is the sum of hours
of all persons engaged in production in the manufacturing sector. Labor cost is obtained from the
NIPA. The price index of labor is then obtained implicitly from the series on hours and the cost of
labor. To convert the wage index into an hourly wage rate, the labor price index is multiplied by the
hourly wage rate for 1982 obtained from the President's Economic Report (1988). The labor input
quantity is then defined as the reported labor cost divided by the hourly wage rate.
The price of intermediate inputs is derived from a Tomqvist index (normalized at 1982) of
the prices of materials, energy and purchased services. The quantity of intermediate inputs is
measured as the total cost of materials, energy and purchased services divided by the price index of
intermediate inputs.
Data on the price and quantity of energy are constructed from the Census of Manufactures,
the Annual Survey of Manufactures and the BLS Producer Price Index (PPI) Survey. Data are
available on the quantity and cost of five fuels (electricity, coal, fuel oil, natural gas and
miscellaneous fuels) annually from 1973-198 1, and about every five years through the rest of the
period 1949-1983. For the benchmark years prices are implicitly calculated, interpolated and
extrapolated making use of the PPI and annual estimates of the total cost of purchased fuels
published in the Annual Survey of Manufactures. Quantity indices are calculated for each type of
fuel and then aggregated using a Tornqvist index. The energy price is obtained implicitly as the
ratio of energy cost to quantity.
Materials represent all commodity inputs exclusive of fuels but inclusive of fuel-type inputs
used as feed stocks (e.g., crude oil consumed by petroleum refining, and coal bought by primary
metal refiners for processing into coke). These data are based on Census Bureau series on annual
cost of materials, containers, and supplies. Material input quantities are obtained as the sum of 4
digit costs of materials, containers and supplies deflated using price series constructed from BLS
producer prices and weights computed from BEA input-output tables of the U.S. economy.11
Purchased services are obtained from the input-output tables of the U.S. economy. Service
shares are computed as the proportion of the value of production represented by service inputs from
annual input-output tables. Next, service costs are obtained by applying the service shares to the
Census value of production. Purchased services input quantities are obtained from the cost
estimates deflated by prices from either the BLS producer or consumer price survey.
The nominal value of dividends is obtained from the series Cash Dividends Charged to
Retained Earnings obtained from the Quarterly Financial Report. The real value of dividends is
calculated by deflating the nominal value by the GNP deflator (normalized at 1982). The price of
dividends is accordingly defined to be P2 =(u
-u,)p,/(l-
u1),u is the effective personal tax rate on
dividend income, u1 is the effective tax rate on capital gains and p, is the ON? deflator. The series
on the GNP deflator is obtained from the President's Economic Report (1988). The data relating to
the effective tax rates on dividend income and on capital gains are obtained from Feldstein & Jun
(1987) for the years 1953 to 1984. This has been extended to 1986 by using the values for 1984.
Physical capital is defined to be the sum of the net capital stocks of structures and
equipment. The deflator for physical capital is taken to be the price index for investment. This is
obtained as the ratio of investment in current dollars to the investment in 1982 prices. All of the
data on capital stocks and investment are obtained from Fixed Reproducible and Tangible Wealth
in the U.S. 1925 -1986.The post-tax purchase price of capital is calculated as the investment
deflator multiplied by (1 -vk-uz),where Vk is the investment tax credit, u is the corporate income
tax rate and z is the present value of capital consumption allowances.
Data on the investment tax credit from 1962 to 1980 are obtained from Jorgenson and
Sullivan [1981]. Since the investment tax credit was only instituted in 1962 the value for Vk before
1962 is taken to be zero. For 1981 Vk is assigned a value of 8%, an average of 6% and 10%, the
investment tax credit for different classes of economic goods under the economic recovery act of
1981. For the years 1982 to 1985 a value of is assigned so as to be in the same range of
magnitude as the years preceding it. Data on the corporate income tax rate for the years 1947-1981
is also obtained from Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981), for 1982 the rate is obtained from Auerbach
(1983), while for 1983-1985 the rate is 0.46, which is equal to the rate for the period 1979-1982. The12
present value of capital consumption allowances is calculated as z =a(1-Ovk)/(r+a),where, a is the
ratio of capital consumption allowances to capital stock less treasury stock (at cost), obtained from
the Quarterly Financial Report, 0 is 0.5in1962-63 and zero everywhere else and r is the rate of
return on US Treasury securities 10 year maturity.'6
The stock of debt is defined to be the sum of two components; installments due in more than
one year on long-term loans from banks, and on other long-term debt. These series are end-of-
period stocks for the fourth quarter and are obtained from the Quarterly Financial Report. The
interest rate on debt is the rate of return on U.S. Treasury securities 10 year maturity. The discount
rate is p(l -u)/(1-
u1),where p is the Moody's equity return on AAA corporations.
The estimation model consists of the post-tax net variable profit function (9), the output,
labor and dividend variable profit component equation set (11), and the capital and debt equation
set (13). There are six equations.'7 The endogenous variables are post-tax net variable profit,
output, labor, and the dividend variable profit components, capital and debt. In order to estimate
the system of equations, errors must be added to the equations. Errors with zero expected value are
added to equation sets (9) and (11). The errors associated with equation set (13) occur upon
removal of the conditional expectations operator and the substitution of the realized values of the
variables. These errors represent unanticipated information which becomes available after the time
that the capital and debt decisions are made. Thus the conditional expected value of these errors is
zero at the time of the capital and debt decisions. it is also assumed that the errors form a positive
definite symmetric covariance matrix.
The estimation model consists of equations which contain expected future values of
variables (see equation set (13)). In order to estimate these Euler equations, Hansen and Singleton
(1982) developed a generalized method of moments estimator. Moreover, Pindyck and Rotemberg
(1982) have shown that this estimator is equivalent to the nonlinear three stage least squares
estimator (see Jorgenson and Laffont (1974)) when the errors are homoskedastic. The estimator
involves the selection of instruments. Lagged values of relative prices, interest rate, post-tax
variable profit, capital and debt are used as instruments. The estimator is consistent and efficient
(for the set of instruments that are selected).13
The estimation results are presented in table I. The results show that the standard errors of
the estimates are small relative to the estimates. The standard errors of each of the equations are
also small relative to the mean of the endogenous variables. The correlation coefficients between the
actual and predicted values of the endogenous variables are generally high. Using the i-statistic (see
Jorgenson and Laffont (1974) and Pindyck and Rotemberg (1982), we can test the overidentifying
restrictions of the model. This test permits us to determine whether or not production and financial
decisions are based on optimizing behavior. The i-statistic is distributed as a chi-square with the
degrees of freedom given by (13 instruments) x (6 equations) -(27parameters estimated) =51.In
our model the value of X51 at a 5% level of significance is 68.67. The value of the J-statistic is 58.93.
Hence the null hypothesis, that the model is correctly specified, is accepted at the 5% level of
significance. This implies that production and financial decisions are based on optimizing behavior.
The results from table I imply that the estimated magnitudes of net post-tax variable profit,
output, labor and dividend variable profit components, capital and debt are positive at each point in
the sample. This means that the monotenicity condition on the post-tax net variable profit function
is satisfied as the function is increasing in the output price and capital, and decreasing in variable
factor prices, dividend price and debt. In addition, we also find that the function is convex in prices.
III. PRODUCrION, PROFITABILITY, AND DIVIDENDS
In this section we investigate how financial considerations affect allocation decisions relating
to output supply and input demands. In addition, we determine the resulting allocative effects on
profitability for U.S. manufacturing. There are two issues that pertain to changes in financial
position. The first centers on the production and profitability effects when the tax code is changed,
thereby altering the opportunity cost of paying dividends. In this case, there is a change in the
difference between personal income and capital gains tax rates. This differential reflects the price of
dividends. The second issue concerns the effects of excessive debt. In this situation we consider
changes in outstanding debt levels that have been determined by financing decisions in previous
periods. This issue is only properly addressed in a short-run context, since debt is predetermined.14
TABLE I: Estimation Results
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Thus the excessiveness of debt is defined relative to the level representing outcomes of past
temporary equilibria.
Consider first the effects of changes in the price of dividends. Moreover, since changes in
output and variable input prices affect dividend payments as well, weconsider all short-nm price
elasticities. The price elasticities are denoted by,
(14.1) e =(I+ s1s3 -8,1s,)1s1 i, j= 1,.. . , n+ I
where cu is the elasticity of the ith quantity with respect to the jth price, 8 =1,,,= 0.Further, recall
that Si> 0 for output and s1 < 0 for dividends and variable inputs.'8
The price elasticity results are presented in table H. From this table, increases in output
price cause increases in output supply, variable input demands and dividend payments.In addition,
increases in variable input and dividend prices decrease output supply, variable input demands and
dividend payments. The results indicate that dividends are substantially more inelastic than output
supply and variable input demands. Indeed, a one percent increase in the dividend price,that is, a
one percent increase in the differential between the personal income and capital gains tax rates,
cause dividend payments to decline by 0.4 percent. Moreover, dividend price changeselicit
relatively more inelastic responses than changes in the other prices. A one percentincrease in the
price of dividends causes output supply and variable factor demands to fall,but the results are quite
inelastic, ranging on average from 0.12 percent to 0.17 percent.
The price of dividends affects output supply, variable input demands and therefore variable
profit. Noting that post-tax variable profit is defined as ,t (1-s2) where s2 =-P2D/4is the
negative of the dividend component of variable profit, then
(14.2) e, =Es2(1-s2) -p]/(1-s2).
A one percent increase in the price of dividends reduces post-tax variable profit by 0.044 percent on
average, with a sample standard deviation of 0.012.The signaling benefits of dividends implies that
profitability increases as dividend payments rise. Thus we can definedividend signaling benefits as16
TABLE II
Short-run Price Elasticities
(mean values and sample standard deviation in parentheses)
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the percentage change in post-tax variable profit relative to the percentage change in dividends
brought about from a one percent change in the opportunity cost of dividends. In other words
(14.3) e=eSe
where e, is from (14.2), and e is from (14.1). The mean value of signaling benefits is 0.12 with a
sample standard deviation of 0.043. Thus a one percent increase in dividend payments leads to a
0.12 percent increase in post-tax variable profit for U.S. manufacturing.
The second issue relates to the effects of excessive debt. We investigate the effects of changes
in outstanding debt on production, dividend payments and profitability. In addition, we compare
these results to the effects of increases in asset or capital stock levels and the effects of technological
change. The debt and capital elasticities and the effects of technological change on output supply,
variable input demands, and dividend payments are given by
(15.1) e13.js1+e, i1,...,n+1,j=B,K,t
where e,j is the effect of j on post-tax net variable profit. The results are found in table 111.
Focusing on the issue of excessive debt, we find that increases in outstanding debt causes output
supply, dividends and variable factor demands to decline. A one percent increase in debt leads to an
approximately 0.05 percent decrease in the supply of output and the demand for variable inputs,
while dividend payments decrease by 0.14 percent.
The agency cost of outstanding debt can be defined in terms of foregone profitability. In
elasticity terms, the effect on post-tax variable profit is
(15.2)
Our results show that the agency cost of outstanding debt is about 0.04 percent. The decline in
profitability associated with excessive debt is consistent with the claim that increases in debt cause18
agency costs. These results for the U.S. manufacturing sector are similar to the results found by
Kim and Maksimovic (1990) for the U.S. airline industry. They estimated that a one percent
increase in debt caused variable cost to rise by 0.034 percent. In their model output was exogenous
so that agency costs manifest themselves as a rise in variable cost. In our model output is
endogenous so that agency costs appear as a reduction in variable profit.
Changes in the level of capital and technology also affect the short run equilibrium. It is
interesting to note from table III that technological change mitigates the effect of excessive debt on
dividend payments. In addition, our results show that the main element governing dividend growth
is capital stock expansion. Dividends almost grow in proportion to capital. This result means that
the dividend payout ratio, measured as dividends per dollar of capital stock is relatively constant for
the U.S. manufacturing sector. Indeed the proportional growth of dividends in relation to capital
can be considered an indication of the signaling role of dividends.
IV. ADJUSTMENT COSTS
The dynamic features of the model are associated with the adjustment costs of capital
accumulation and debt issues. The adjustment cost parameters appear in the Euler equations
(equation set (13)) and their estimated values are presented in table I. The three adjustment cost
parameters are a, aBB,u.The own adjustment cost parameter estimates, a, and aBB,are
positive as required. This result means that net capital investment increases marginal installation
costs and new bond issues increase marginal agency costs. The cross adjustment cost parameter a,
is negative. This means that capital investment and bond issues are adjustment complements. As
net capital investment occurs, the marginal agency cost of debt issues decreases. In other words,
marginal agency costs are reduced when debt issues finance capital expansion. Adjustment costs are
also convex in net capital investment and new bond issues, as >0.
Debt issues increase agency costs and thereby influence the adjustment towards long run
equilibrium. The agency costs associated with debt issues create a wedge between the
contemporaneous and long run effects on profitability associated with bond financing. A measure19
TABLE Ill
Capital and Debt Elasticities and Rates of Technological Change
(means and sample standard deviations in parentheses)
Capital Bonds Technology
Output 0.838 -0.052 0.089
(0.186) (0.019) (0.007)
Dividends 0.865 -0.143 0.106
(0.220) (0.029) (0.007)
Labor 1.174 -0.057 0.092
(0.165) (0.019) (0.007)
Intermediate 0.649 -0.050 0.083
(0.210) (0.018) (0.007)
Variable Profit 0.641 -0.037 0.099
(0.211) (0.020) (0.007)20
of the relative importance of the adjustment costs from debt issues can be derived from equation
(13.2). In long run equilibrium when marginal debt adjustment cost equals zero, the reduction
invariable profit from the agency cost of debt fmancing equals the differential between the post-tax
rate of return to shareholders and the post-tax interest rate on bonds. The rate differential is
defined to be W(t) =p(t)(1 -u(t))/(1-
u1(t))-r(t)(1 u(t)), where r(t) (1 -u(t))=R(t),r is the
interest rate on bonds and u is the corporate income tax rate. The opportunity cost of funds (that
is the rate of return to shareholders) must be sufficiently greater than the interest rate in order to pay
for the marginal agency cost. Thus in the long run the ratio between the marginal agency cost and
the net opportunity cost of funds (\V) equals unity. Thus the relative importance of debt
adjustment cost in period t, when equilibrium deviates from the long run, is defined by the ratio of
marginal adjustment cost to thenet opportunity cost of funds. This ratio is [aBBB(t) +
/W5(t). Table IV shows that relative marginal debt adjustment cost averages 0.05 over the sample,
with a maximum value of 0.48 and a minimum value of 0.005. This result means that for a $1.00
opportunity cost of debt (including interest) there is an additional adjustment cost of $0.05.
The relative importance of capital adjustment cost can be seen from equation (13.1). In long
run equilibrium from (13.1) with zero marginal adjustment cost the marginal profit associated with
capital expansion equals the rental rate. The rental rate is defined as WK(t) Q(t) (p(t) (1 -
(1-
u1(t))+ 8), and it is the long run opportunity cost of capital services. In a similar fashion to
debt issues, the significance of the deviation from long run equilibrium can be measured by the ratio
of marginal capital adjustment cost to the rental rate. This ratio is [a0K(t) +a B(t)]/WK(t).
Table IV shows that relative capital adjustment cost averages 0.17 over the sample, with a maximum
value of 0.48 and a minimum value of 0.014. This means that for a $1.00 rental of capital services
there is an additional adjustment cost of $0.17. Our results show that there are adjustment costs
from financing capital expansion through debt issues and from installing the new capital. Thus if
$1.00 of capital services is financed through debt then adjustment costs on average, add another
$0.22 ($0.05 + $0.17) to the cost of capital services. The findings associated with capital adjustment
costs are consistent with Berndt and Morrison (1981), Pindyck and Rotemberg (1982), and Mohnen,21
TABLE IV








minimum 0.005 0.0 1422
Nadiri and Prucha (1986) for the U.S. manufacturing sector, while this is the first time that debt
adjustment costs have been estimated.
V. SCALE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
Since outstanding debt and the price of dividends affect production, the degree of returns to
scale and the rate of technological change also depend on debt and the dividend price. Returns to
scale are defined as the proportional increase in output associated with variable and quasi-fixed
input growth. Adhering to the standard definition of returns to scale, it is assumed that managerial
inputs and technology do not change. Using the post-tax net variable profit function the degree of
returns to scale is
(16)RRS -s/si÷ äln"/älnKK/sl,
recalling that s, <0i =2,... , n+2.'The first column of table V shows the degree of returns to
scale. We estimate that for the U.S. manufacturing sector production is characterized by essentially
constant returns to scale.
The elasticities of returns to scale with respect to the price of dividends and to outstanding
bonds are presented in the second and third columns of table V. As dividend payments become
more expensive or agency costs increase through higher debt, the degree of returns to scale declines.
Since there are essentially constant returns to scale, a one percent increase in the price of dividends
or outstanding debt decreases the degree of returns to scale on average by about two points.
The rate of technological change, based on the net variable profit function, is given by
(17)RTC =(aln4"/&t)/s1
Column four in table V shows that for U.S. manufacturing the average rate of technological change
is 1.3 percent. In addition, the rate of technological change does not fluctuate over the sample
period.20 The elasticities of the rate of technological change with respect to the dividend price and23
TABLE V
Returns to Scale and Rates of Technological Change
(sanple standard deviations in parentheses)
Year RRS RRS4 RRSb RTC RTCd RTCb
1959 0.903 -0.017 -0.019 0.016 -0.0003 0.0002
1969 0.922 -0.017 -0.019 0.014 -0.0003 0.0003
1979 0.973 -0.013 -0.014 0.010 -0.0002 0.0001













outstanding debt are presented in the last two columns of table V. We fmd that the dividend price
and outstanding debt generate rather small effects on the rate of technological change. In addition,
these effects almost offset each other. Thus a lowering of the dividend price (for example through a
decrease in the personal income tax rate) increases the rate of technological change, but this impact
can be neutralized if technological change is accompanied by growing debt.
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth is an indicator of dynamic efficiency and represents
the difference between output and input growth rates. Traditionally this difference arises from
technological change and scale effects. We now show how the signaling benefits of dividends and
the agency costs of debt affect TFP growth. Debt and dividend affect TFP growth because debt
issues and the price of dividends influence profitability over time through changes in the growth
rates of output and variable inputs. By definition,
n.2
(18) TFPG =dlny-E (P1v/c)dlnv1 -(WKKJc)dInK
where c = PlyI+ W,K is total cost.2' By taking a total differential of both the net variable
profit function (equation (8) net of adjustment costs) and the definition of net variable profit (4=
n. 2
P,y -E P1v1-P2D), and using Hotelling's Lemma (see Diewert (1982)), we get
I— 3
(19)s,dlny + Es1dlnv1+ s2dlnD =(ä1n4"/älnK)dlnK
+ (aln4?'/alnB) dlnB + (äln$"/ät)
where s, P1y/4'> 0, s, =-P,v/4'< 0, i =3,...,n+ 2 and s2 =- P2D/4'< 0 are the net variable
profit components of output, variable inputs and dividends. Next by multiplying both sides of (19)
by "/c and adding (18) to both sides yields25
(20) TFPG =(1-(4/c)s1)dlny+(4Ic)8ln4"I&+(4'/c)((a1n4/anK)
-(WKK/+'))dlnK+(4/c)s2dInD +(+'/c)(an4/alnB)dInB
Thus there are five components to TFP growth. The first term reflects the scale effect, the second
term represents technological change, the third term captures the capital adjustment effect, the
fourth term represents the signaling effect arising from dividend payments and the fifth term shows
the agency cost effect associated with debt financing. If dividends are growing, then the signaling
benefits associated with this growth imply that there are TFP gains. In addition, if bond issues are
growing, then agency costs imply that there are TFP losses.
Table VI shows TFP growth rates and their decomposition over the period 1956-1985 for
U.S. manufacturing. The signaling effect contributes to the average annual growth rate of TFP
by 0.0005 or 4.2 percent of the total. The agency cost effect reduces the TFP growth by .0004 or by
3.3 percent of the total. Kim and Maksimovic (1990) decompose TFP growth for the U.S. airline
industry based on a variable cost formulation. They do not have a dividend signaling component,
but their agency cost component reduces airline TFP growth by 2.6 percent. This figure is
consistent with our agency cost component for manufacturing. However, we estimate that financial
decisions not only reduce TFP growth through bond issues, but also increase TFP growth through
the signaling benefits of dividend payments. Indeed, we estimate that the dynamic efficiency effects
associated with dividend payments and bond issues nearly offset each other for the U.S.
manufacturing sector.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we estimated a model with debt agency costs and dividend signaling benefits
that affects production, profitability, and productivity growth. The model is applied to the U.S.
manufacturing sector. Signaling benefits and agency costs are measured by their impact on
profitability. A one percent increase in dividends causes post-tax variable profit to rise by 0.12
percent, while a one percent increase in outstanding debt causes variable profit to decline by 0.04
percent.26
TABLE VI
Total Factor Productivity Growth and Decomposition
(Average Annual Growth Rates)
Year TFPG Scale Tech. Change Cap. Adj. Dividends Debt
1960-65 0.014 -0.005 0.018 -0.0003 0.0007 -0.0006
1966-71 0.013 -0.005 0.016 0.002 0.0004 -0.0004
1972-77 0.013 -0.0009 0.013 0.002 0.0002 -0.0007
1978-83 0.010 -0.0002 0.011 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0006
1956-85 0.012 -0.003 0.014 0.0006 0,0005 -0.000427
Agency costs, in conjunction with capital installation costs, prevent the manufacturing
sector from costlessly adjusting to long-run equilibrium. The deviation from long-run equilibrium is
reflected by the result that for an additional dollar obtained by issuing debt and used to finance
capital expansion, adjustment costs are $0.fl. This amount consists of $0.05 attributable to the
agency cost from bond issues, and the remaining S0.17 arises from capital installation costs.
The existence of signaling benefits and agency costs imply that output supply, and variable
input demands, are affected by financial considerations. rn the short run a one percent increase in
debt causes output supply and variable input demands to decline by 0.05 percent, while a one
percent increase in the price of dividends generates about three times the effect on production.
Moreover, in the short run, more expensive dividends and excessive debt cause about the same
reduction in variable profit. A one percent increase in outstanding debt or dividend price reduces
post-tax variable profit by approximately 0.04 percent for the U.S. manufacturing sector.
The dynamic efficiency of the manufacturing sector is affected by debt agency costs and
dividend signaling benefits. Signaling benefits contribute about 4.2 percent of the growth in
productivity, while agency costs reduce efficiency by 3.3 percent. Thus, while financial
considerations do in fact influence dynamic efficiency for the manufacturing sector, the efficiency
enhancing signaling benefits from dividends are nearly offset by the efficiency reducing agency costs
from bond financing. It would be interesting to investigate in further research whether these
efficiency offsetting fmancial effects operate in different industries and in different countries.28
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NOTES
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'This literature generally relates to single equation models. In addition, those models do not use duality theory
in the integration of production and financing decisions.
2See Diewert (1982) for a survey of duality theory.
3Kim and Maksimovic (1990) have utilized duality theory in a short-run equilibrium context.
'The production function has the usual properties of increasing at a decreasing rate in the inputs, decreasing at
a decreasing rate in the changes to the capital input. The model can easily be generalized to multiple outputs,
multiple capital inputs, and multiple managerial inputs.
s5 Morrison and Berndt (1981), Pindyck and Rotemberg (1982), and Mohnen, Nadiri, and Prucha (1986) for
empirical studies relating adjustment costs to production in the U.S. manufacturing sector.
'It should be noted that the managerial cost function leads to a stylized representation of the interaction between
production and financial decisions. Like other empirical studies, we do not derive thc functional link between
production and financial decisions.
71n terms of managerial cost, since iisthe factor price of managerial input and cost functions are homogeneous
of degree one in factor prices, C' =fl(i,V)=pH(V)where V is the vector of non-price variables affecting
managerial cost. The expression 1iH(V) is the managerial cost function.
'Clearly, it is possible to have output, capital and variable input quantities affect the H function in equation (2).
For example, agency costs could manifest themselves in terms of increases in outstanding debt relative to the
capital stock. However, we would still obtain a production/managerial function as is defined by equation (3).
'See Bernstein and Nadiri (1988) for the derivation of the post tax purchase price of capital.
'°This function has the same properties as a variable profit function (see Diewert (1982)).
"The monotonicity and concavity conditions of the net variable profit function with respect to the prices are not
imposed by us but are checked from the estimation results. In addition, the (t) notation is generally now omitted.
I2Morrisonand l3erndt (1981) and Mohnen, Nadiri, and Prucha (1986) in the context of quasi-fixed factors.
'3Equations (9) and (10) can be combined by a suitable reinterpretation of the a parameters reflecting adjustment
costs as the proportional reduction in normalized net variable profit.32
'The n+2 variable profit component, which relates to the normalizing variable factor, can be eliminated since
n.j
= 1 —E;•
'SIt is assumed that there is a non-binding constraint that S(t)O, share repurchases are not permitted. This
assumption is satisfied for the manufacturing sector.
'6ThC constant 0 is defined by the Long Amendment, according to which firms had to reduce the depreciable base
of the assets by the amount of the ITC (See Hulten and Robertson (1982)).
"The adjustment cost function is not estimated as a separate equation because the parameters are contained in
the capital and debt equations. In addition, there are no data on adjustment costs.
"The price elasticities associated with the n+2 variable factor, which is the intermediate input, is calculated as a
residual. It should be noted that all elasticities use the predicted values of the endogenous variables from the
estimation model. In other words, we use the fitted values for output supply, labor and intermediate demands,
and dividend payments.
'9Note that in the definition of returns to scale, debt and capital are calculated at their existing levels. Also recall
that i = 3,. .. , n+2represents the variable factors, i = 1 is output and i = 2 is dividends, which does not enter
the definition of returns to scale.
20The definition of the rate of technological change is the output-based concept. There is also an input-based
definition of the rate of technological change, but the two measures are equal when there is constant returns to
scale (see Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982)).
2IDiewert(1989) for a survey of the issues relating to the definition and measurement of TFP growth.
Bernstein (1992) and Morrison (1992) show how capital adjustment costs affect TFP growth.
Table 6 is a Tornqvist approximation to equation (20) (sec Diewert (1989)).